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INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN THE FORMATION OF 
FALSE MEMORIES: 
IS SUGGESTIBILITY A PREDICTIVE FACTOR? 
 
 
 
Rinad Beidas 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Individual differences in the formation of false memories using suggestibility as a 
predictive factor were investigated. Undergraduate males and females were administered 
two false memory paradigms: the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) (1995) word 
recognition task and the Kassin & Kiechel (KK) ALT key task (1996). Subsequently, 
participants were administered the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale (GSS) 2 to determine 
their suggestibility scores. As predicted, higher suggestibility scores were correlated with 
forming a false memory in the Kassin & Kiechel task. However, suggestibility was not 
correlated with the DRM task. These results provide evidence that suggestibility is a 
predictive factor for one false memory paradigm but not the other, indicating that perhaps 
different cognitive mechanisms underlie the two. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 Many people come to believe events which have never actually happened to them. 
What kinds of people are susceptible to this? This is a question currently being 
investigated in relation to the “False Memory Syndrome”. A false memory occurs when 
participants in an experiment come to remember an event which has never actually 
occurred (Loftus, 1997). Questions relating to false memory have recently received 
considerable attention from experimental psychologists; especially which factors might 
predict the formation of false memories (e.g. Loftus & Pickrell, 1995; Roediger & 
McDermott, 1995, Kassin & Kiechel, 1996; Loftus, 1997; Peiffer & Trull, 2000). This 
phenomenon has recently garnered attention due to its psycho-legal implications. This 
paper will examine whether suggestibility plays a role in the formation of false memories 
using two different false memory paradigms; one involving memory for words and the 
other involving memory for enduring events, such as an experience during childhood. 
 Research about false memories is important because of its psycho-legal 
applications pertaining to recovered memories, eyewitness questioning, and individual 
differences in the formation of false memories. Research on false memories has direct 
implications on the recent controversy about adults who recover memories of sexual 
abuse experienced during childhood. There is also evidence from the false memory 
literature that indicates that questioning techniques used on participants can alter their 
memories, thus indicating that similar experiences might occur to eyewitnesses based on 
police questioning techniques. Although research has shown that it is possible to implant 
 78 Colgate University Journal of the Sciences 
false memories in individuals, little is understood about what kind of individuals are more 
likely to form false memories. This is important because it is relevant to understanding 
what kinds of people might be more suggestible to false recovered memories of sexual 
abuse and alteration of memory for witnessed events.  
 
 
Paradigms for False Memories 
 
 A false memory can be operationally defined as a memory for a word that a 
participant has not been presented. This term can also pertain to memories for an event 
which has never occurred. There are different types of false memories explored in the 
laboratory, with qualitatively different experimental techniques used to induce them. Two 
particularly interesting paradigms are the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) (1995) 
paradigm and the Kassin & Kiechel (KK) (1996) paradigm.  The DRM is a paradigm 
which produces formation of false memory for words, while the KK paradigm produces 
false memories for an enduring event. 
The first type of false memory relates to explicit memory for words presented on 
a semantically related list, where participants subsequently recall or recognize non-
presented words that are semantically related to presented words. One particular 
technique used to create this phenomenon is the (DRM) (1995) paradigm which shows 
that when participants study lists of words, they often falsely report recognizing a never 
presented associate word as appearing in the original list. This never presented word is 
called the critical lure. All of the words in the list are semantically associated with the 
critical lure. When asked whether or not participants “know” (are confident the word was 
presented but do not remember the actual presentation) or “remember” (are confident the 
word was presented and remember something about the actual presentation) that the 
never presented associate word was presented on the list, participants often claim that 
they remember the word (Roediger & McDermott, 1995). In this particular scenario, 
participants have a memory for a certain word which they think that they have heard, 
although in reality, this word has not been presented.  
In numerous experiments, this word recognition task has been manipulated to try 
and reduce false memory effects. Gallo, Roberts, & Seamon (1997)  found that warning 
participants about the false recognition effect reduced but did not eliminate the effect.   
Seamon, Luo, & Gallo (1998) showed that even without recognition of list items due to 
speed of presentation, participants formed false memories for the semantically associated 
critical lures. Both of these experiments indicate just how strong the DRM phenomenon 
is. The DRM paradigm has been widely recognized as an excellent way to produce false 
memories in a laboratory setting without creating a stressful situation for the participant, 
as well as excluding confounds present in other false memory tasks such as social 
demand and compliance. Many researchers argue that since participants claim to be 
confident in their memories for these words, that these false memories are as real as their 
memories for other presented words (e.g. Koriat, Goldsmith, & Pansky, 2000; Ghetti, 
Qin, & Goodman, 2002). Roediger & McDermott (1995) argue that false memories for 
words might even be relevant to enduring events, such that similar mechanisms might 
underlie the formation of the two kinds of false memories.  
                                                                                                              
    
  Colgate University Journal of the Sciences 79 
 The second type of memory relevant for investigating the false memory syndrome 
is memory for enduring events. This has been implicated as an important research topic 
because of its psycho-legal applications pertaining to adults recovering memories of 
sexual abuse as a child. This type of memory involves recollections of personal events 
such as the wedding of a sibling, a first love, or a recent event in one’s life. It seems that 
people can come to believe that entire events took place in their lifetime which actually 
never occurred, as the examples below will show. This occurs most frequently through 
misleading post event information which alters people’s memory (Loftus & Pickerell, 
1995).   
 Examples of the effects of misleading post event information come from early 
research. Loftus (1973) showed that  people who witnessed an event that were exposed to 
leading questions or misleading information came to have distorted memories, such as 
the presence of broken glass at a car accident scene when in fact there was none. After 
this finding, researchers developed innovative paradigms to examine how malleable 
human memory is. For example, Loftus & Pickerell (1995) showed that after giving 
misleading information to participants, 29% came to believe that they were lost in a 
shopping mall at the age of 5. Hyman, Husband, & Billings (1995) showed that 20% of 
participants came to believe an event had occurred in their childhood such as a hospital 
visit when in fact, the event had never occurred. Some participants even made up specific 
details which they believed had occurred during this experience.  
One particular study that is frequently cited in the false memory literature is 
Kassin & Kiechel’s groundbreaking experiment (1996) which examined the role of social 
compliance in the formation of false memories for a specific event. Kassin & Kiechel 
showed that participants were more likely to form false memories when accused of 
experiencing the event by a confederate witness. In this paradigm, researchers asked their 
participants to type the letters they heard on a computer, but were asked not to press the 
ALT key because it was causing problems. After a minute of typing, the computer 
crashed as part of the design of the experiment. A distressed experimenter accused the 
participant of ruining all of his data by pressing the ALT key. Half of the participants 
were told by a confederate witness that they had witnessed the participant press the ALT 
key prior to the crash of the program. The other half of participants were not accused by 
the confederate witness. Kassin & Kiechel’s results indicated that participants who were 
accused of hitting the ALT key by a confederate witness were more likely to sign a 
confession, internalize guilt, and confabulate details in their memory consistent with the 
events. The important measures in this experiment which relate to the formation of false 
memories are internalization of guilt and confabulation of details. These two variables 
indicate that participants did not just comply with the experimenter and admit to pressing 
the ALT key, but that they actually formed a memory about the event.  
This experiment was an important one in three different ways. First of all, it 
indicated that social compliance was an important factor in whether or not someone 
thought they pressed the ALT key since presence of a confederate witness produced more 
robust results. Secondly, the participants’ confabulation of details such as which letter 
they pressed before the ALT key indicated that their memory had been altered. Thirdly, 
the results indicated that social stressors played a role in the formation of false memories, 
a mechanism which has not been examined in relation to the DRM. This raises an 
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interesting question regarding whether or not a memory for an enduring event is different 
from a memory for a word. 
At this point, there is little dissention that false memories can be formed in 
participants (Loftus, 1997). However, an interesting question that researchers have given 
little attention to is: What kinds of people and character traits are susceptible to this 
syndrome?  Other researchers have posed this question, yet few have undertaken its 
investigation. 
 
Suggestibility 
 
A method for measuring suggestibility emanates from Gudjonsson's research. It 
works based on the assumption that an individual’s suggestibility is due to his or her 
cognitive coping strategies during interviews. Situational variables such as questioning 
techniques can affect whether or not certain people respond to misleading information or 
questions (Gudjonsson, 1987). One recognized scale for measuring suggestibility is the 
Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale 2 (1997). It has been measured as being both reliable 
and valid in detecting suggestibility (Liebman et al., 2002). Clare, Gudjonsson, Rutter, & 
Cross (1994) found the GSS 2 to have high inter rater reliability (as cited in Gudjonsson, 
1997). Evidence on validity of the GSS 2 comes from Sirgurdsson & Gudjonsson (1996) 
who found that scoring high on the GSS 2 was correlated with more suggestible behavior 
in Icelandic inmates (as cited in Gudjonsson, 1997).  
Peiffer & Trull (2000) examined suggestibility (as measured by GSS 2 Total 
Score) and its link to the formation of false memories in the DRM paradigm. The results 
of this experiment indicated that there was no relationship between the DRM and 
suggestibility because the analysis showed no statistical significance. However, no 
researchers have replicated the work of Peiffer & Trull. Because Peiffer & Trull’s was 
the first study of its kind, replication is necessary in order to validate the null results. 
Since the question of the effect of individual differences on the formation of false 
memories still remains, it is important to replicate Peiffer & Trull’s (2000) study to 
ensure that their results are both valid and reliable. It does not make sense to rule out 
suggestibility as a predictive factor based on the results of one study. 
When examining the correlation between suggestibility and formation of false 
memories, Peiffer & Trull (2000) ignored the second type of false memory which has 
been very important in the research of false memories: memory for enduring events. Until 
now, a lack of research has looked at the link between suggestibility and the formation of 
false memories in paradigms such as Kassin & Kiechel’s (1996). Thus, in the following 
experiment, I explore suggestibility in terms of the DRM (1995) paradigm and the KK 
(1996) paradigm in a synthesis of tasks. 
The reasons for my experiment are two fold. First, to replicate Peiffer & Trull’s 
(2000) findings showing that suggestibility is not related to the DRM paradigm. Second, 
to examine whether suggestibility is linked to the KK (1996) paradigm, as this 
relationship has never been investigated before. Reasons for a possible relationship 
between suggestibility and the KK paradigm include that social compliance is a 
component of suggestibility (Gudjonsson, 1989).   
There are three possible outcomes for this experiment. First, it may be that 
suggestibility is not related to the formation of false memories in either of these 
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paradigms indicating that more research is necessary to understand how the two 
paradigms relate to one another. Second, suggestibility may be correlated with one task 
and not the other task, indicating that these two types of false memories do not have 
similar underlying cognitive mechanisms. Third, suggestibility may be correlated with 
both tasks, indicating that the two false memories have similar underlying cognitive 
mechanisms. 
 If suggestibility is related with either the DRM task or the KK paradigm, I predict 
that higher suggestibility scores will have a positive relationship with the formation of 
false memories. 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
Forty-five students from an introductory psychology class (33 female, 12 male) ranging 
from ages 17 to 22 received 1 hour of credit for their participation.  
 
Materials 
 Suggestibility was assessed using the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale 2 (1997). 
The GSS included administering a story on a tape recorder followed by free recall. 
Twenty minutes later, 20 questions were asked of the participants. These two types of 
questions consisted of 5 control questions and 15 misleading questions. The control 
questions included questions such as (Was the boy’s name William?). The 15 misleading 
questions consisting of three different forms. The misleading questions included leading 
questions (e.g.” Was the boy frightened of the big van coming up the hill? when a van 
was not mentioned), affirmative questions (e.g. “Was the boy allowed to stay away from 
school on the day of the accident?” when it was summer vacation), and false alternative 
questions (e.g. “Did the boy on the bicycle pass a stop sign or traffic lights?” when 
neither was present) (Liebman et al., 2002). After participants were asked these 20 
questions, they were given negative feedback and told that they would have to answer the 
questions again. Scoring was based on participant’s affirmative responses to the 15 
misleading questions (Yield 1) and whether or not they changed their answers on their 
second responses after being told they answered incorrectly the first time (Shift). Thus 
GSS 2 total score was comprised of Yield 1+Shift (Gudjonsson, 1997). 
 Materials for the DRM (1995) paradigm consisted of six lists of 15 words. Each 
list took approximately 30 seconds to play. The six lists are included in Appendix 1. 
Participants were asked to recall the words that they heard after each list was played (see 
Appendix 2). Participants were then given 192 words (90 old words, 6 critical lures, and 
96 new words). The 90 old words were the ones which they had heard played on the tape 
recorder for them and comprised the six different lists. The six critical lures were the 
words which were semantically associated with each list but not presented. The 96 new 
words were chosen at random from a dictionary to match the presented words on length. 
Participants were then asked to identify whether words were old or new.  
 Materials for the KK (1996) paradigm consisted of an IBM compatible machine 
with a customized typing program that was designed to crash. Prior to the experiment, 
participants were given a questionnaire asking about typing skills (see Appendix 3). After 
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the program crashed, participants were given a questionnaire asking them to elaborate on 
what happened while they were typing (see Appendix 4).  
 
Procedure  
Participants who took part in this experiment were administered the GSS 2 Scale 
(1997), the DRM (1995) paradigm, and an adapted version of the KK (1996) paradigm.  
Participants were administered the GSS 2 story on a tape recorder. Participants 
were then immediately asked to provide free recall on what they had heard. While usually 
the free recall portion of the GSS 2 is a spoken recollection of the story, a written recall 
was used. This is because immediate recall was not relevant for suggestibility scores, and 
thus not relevant to this experiment.  
Participants were then administered the DRM (1995) paradigm. Participants were 
instructed that they would hear lists of words from a recording device and then be tested 
on free recall of each list by writing down the words read to them. Participants were 
given each of the six lists and after each they were allowed as much time as they needed 
to recall any words they could remember. 
After the six lists had been administered, participants were told they would 
receive a packet of words.  For each listed word in this packet, participants were asked to 
circle new if they saw a word that they had not heard in the previous portion of the study, 
or to circle old if it was a word that they had previously heard. If they thought it was an 
old word, participants were instructed as follows. If they generally knew that the word 
was on one of the original lists but couldn’t remember the original presentation, they 
were told to circle ‘K’ (know). If they not only knew the word was on the original list and 
remembered the actual presentation of the word, then they were told to circle 
‘R’(remember). This part of the task was used by DRM to explore the nature of false 
recognition and memory.  
 After the word task was completed, participants were informed that they would 
answer questions on the story which they heard at the beginning of the experiment. After 
administration of these questions, participants were then informed that they had answered 
some of the questions incorrectly and would therefore have to answer all 20 questions 
again.  
After answering the questions, participants were given a brief typing 
questionnaire to enhance the credibility of the Kassin & Kiechel aspect of the experiment. 
Following completion of the questionnaire, participants were instructed to type the letters 
flashing on the screen in front of them. They were given additional instruction not to 
press the ALT key as it had been causing the computer to crash on previous trials. The 
participants pressed enter to begin and went through easy (slow letters flashing), medium, 
and hard blocks (very fast letters flashing) of letters. The reason for this manipulation is 
due to Kassin & Kiechel’s (1996) results which indicated that a fast typing speed was 
more likely to induce false memories in participants. In hard block #2, the computer 
crashed reading “Error 278: Contact programmer”. At that point, the experimenter said 
“You might have pressed the ALT key. Please fill out this questionnaire stating what 
happened while you were typing so I can give it to the programmer and he can try to fix 
the problem.” The questionnaire asked two questions. The first asked whether or not the 
participant pressed the ALT key to assess internalization of guilt. The second asked 
where in the sequence the participant pressed the ALT key to assess confabulation. Once 
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the participants handed in their questionnaires, they were thanked and debriefed about the 
purpose of the experiment. 
 
Results 
 
  Pearson correlation coefficients and t-tests were performed to evaluate the 
relationship between suggestibility and the various relevant measures of memory as 
measured by the DRM (1995) paradigm as well as behavior on the KK (1996) paradigm 
To examine the relationship between GSS 2 total and the relevant variables of the 
DRM paradigm, Pearson Correlation Coefficients were calculated.  These correlations 
were calculated to determine if suggestibility (as measured by GSS total) would predict 
performance on the relevant dependent variables of the DRM paradigm; number of 
critical lures recalled and percentage of critical lures recognized as old. There was no 
significant relationship between GSS 2 total and critical lures recalled, r(45)=.08, p=.30. 
There was also no significant statistical finding between GSS 2 total and number of 
critical lures recognized as old, r(45)=.06, p=.35. None of these relationships were 
statistically significant demonstrating that high suggestibility is not related to the 
formation of false memories in the standard DRM paradigm. 
 To examine whether or not participants formed a false memory of pressing the 
ALT key and the relation to suggestibility, independent groups t-tests were performed 
between those who admitted to pressing the ALT key and those who did not admit 
pressing the ALT key. The only significant result was that GSS 2 total scores were higher 
for participants who admitted to pressing the ALT key (M=13.87, SD=4.72) versus those 
who said they did not press the ALT key (M=11.17, SD=4.69), t(43)=1.82, p=.038. 
Stating that one had a memory for pressing the ALT key (M=3.13, SD=1.13) and that one 
did not have a memory for pressing the ALT key (M=2.90, SD=1.40) was not significant 
in relation to critical lures recalled, t(43)=-.56, p=.58. In addition, stating that one had a 
memory for pressing the ALT key (M=.922, SD=.12) and that one did not have a 
memory for pressing the ALT key (M=.906, SD=.15) was not significant in relation to 
the percentage of critical lures recognized as old, t(43)=.37, p=.40.  
 
Discussion 
 
 The results show that suggestibility is related to behavior in the KK (1996) 
paradigm but not the DRM (1995) false memory paradigm. Specifically, higher levels of 
suggestibility were associated with performance on the KK (1996) paradigm such that the 
mean GSS scores for participants who admitted to pressing the ALT key were higher than 
the mean GSS scores of those participants who denied pressing the ALT key. Conversely, 
GSS 2 scores were not related to the formation of false recall or false recognition in the 
DRM paradigm. A question which necessarily emerges from this finding is why 
suggestibility affects the KK paradigm but not the DRM paradigm. Both paradigms are 
frequently cited in the false memory literature as examples of techniques used in 
experiments to produce false memories.  
 It is necessary to understand how a false memory is formed in the DRM paradigm 
in order to asses what role suggestibility might play in that formation. There are three 
possible models that try and explain how the DRM paradigm works. For example, 
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Johnson’s source monitoring model (1993) suggests that false memories are produced by 
the failure to attribute the source of information from the correct area. Recognition and 
recall both cause the participant to identify where the source of that information comes 
from, and false memories are formed when internally derived information such as an 
inference about a word is confused with an external source, such as studying the word in 
a list (Ghetti et. al., 2002). Semantic association is another model that attempts to explain 
how a false memory occurs in the DRM task is semantic association. Underwood (1965) 
proposes that false recognition responses occur during encoding by the following process. 
When participants see a word such as hot, they might think of its semantic associate, 
cold. Later, if cold is presented as a critical lure, then the participant might have a 
memory of seeing the word cold due to their recognition response (as cited by Roediger 
& McDermott, 1995). This effect should be even more robust when using lists of 
semantically related words, and this is in fact the case (Roediger & McDermott, 1995). A 
third model proposes that perceptual elaboration might be the causal mechanism when 
participants engage in the DRM paradigm. This model proposes that participants imagine 
the associated words while performing the DRM paradigm, leading many participants to 
claim that they “remember” words that are not presented (Drivdahl & Zaragoza, 2001). 
All of the above models are logical ways in which to understand how the DRM task 
causes individuals to form false memories, and research has not yet established which 
one is most valid. 
It is important to note that the above mechanisms may not play a role in the type of 
false memory produced by the KK (1996) paradigm. In this paradigm, participants do in 
fact have altered memories due to their internalization and confabulation regarding the 
pressing of the ALT key. However, the cognitive mechanisms that produce these false 
memories may be different than those that produce false memories in the DRM paradigm. 
Unfortunately, it is unknown at this time what the cognitive mechanisms underlying the 
KK response may be.  One implicated is social compliance (Kassin & Kiechel, 1996). 
Social compliance can be operationally defined in this experiment as behaving in a 
compliant manner towards the experimenter. Perhaps during the Kassin & Kiechel 
paradigm, compliance is the reason that participants admit to pressing the ALT key. 
However, this compliance may be eventually turned into a false memory. 
 An interesting question is what underlying mechanism turns this compliance into a 
false memory. Two plausible explanations are cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) or 
self perception (Bem, 1967). These mechanisms may force the participants to believe that 
if they said they pressed the ALT key, then they must have in fact pressed the ALT key. 
A third explanation for the formation of a false memory in the KK paradigm could 
involve source monitoring (Johnson, 1993). Once a participant admits to pressing the 
ALT key, the participant may later come to believe that they pressed the key because they 
can’t remember what source their information is coming from: complying in saying that 
they pressed the ALT key, or actually believing that they pressed it. While it is interesting 
to examine what underlying cognitive mechanisms cause participants to believe they 
pressed the ALT key, social compliance seems to be the primary mechanism of the 
situation (Kassin & Kiechel, 1996). Perhaps, the KK task (1996) should no longer be 
recognized as a purely “false memory” paradigm and be reclassified as an experiment in 
social compliance.  
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The results of the present experiment indicate that in addition to social compliance, 
suggestibility is an important factor in predicting whether or not a participant will form a 
memory of pressing the ALT key.  
 Suggestibility is generally defined as one’s susceptibility to misleading 
information (Gudjonsson, 1984). However, Eysenck (1991) has suggested that 
suggestibility is a multi-faceted entity and not one uniform dimension (as cited in 
Liebman et. al., 2002). Different individual difference factors of suggestibility include 
intelligence (Gudjonsson, 1988), social desirability (Gudjonsson, 1983), memory 
(Gudjonsson, 1987), acquiescence (Gudjonsson, 1986), compliance (Gudjonsson, 1989), 
and disassociation (Eisen et. al., 2001).  
Three important components of suggestibility for this experiment include 
disassociation, acquiescence, and compliance.  Putnam (1997) has investigated 
dissociative people and memory. He defined dissociative individuals as those who are 
unsure of themselves and do not have stable images of themselves. He found that highly 
dissociative persons were less confident in their memory, which made them more 
vulnerable to misleading information (as cited in Eisen et. al., 2001). This lack of 
confidence is relevant to both the DRM and KK paradigms. Someone with high 
dissociation should be less confident in their memory for both a word task (DRM) as well 
as the ALT key task (KK).  
The other two individual differences of suggestibility that are relevant to this 
experiment are acquiescence and compliance (Eisen et. al., 2001). Acquiescence has been 
defined as a willingness to give in to other individuals (Eisen et. al., 2001). This 
personality trait is relevant to suggestibility because perhaps some of the participants 
were just more likely to give in to saying they pressed the ALT key, rather than really 
forming a memory for it. 
 Social compliance is also a key part of the KK (1996) experiment. Ghetti argues 
that tasks such as the ALT key paradigm involve social compliance and are stressors for 
the participants, thus not being exclusively false memory paradigms such as the DRM 
(2002). Loftus (1997) agrees that external factors such as social compliance and demands 
do play a role in the formation of these types of real world memories. Both of these 
constructs would affect the KK (1996) task much more strongly than the DRM (1995) 
task and thus make it clearer why suggestibility had a stronger relationship with the ALT 
key task (1996) versus the DRM (1995) task. This indicates that there are different 
individual factors within suggestibility which affect its relation with the KK (1996) 
paradigm, which in turn indicate that there might be different cognitive mechanisms 
occurring in this paradigm when comparing it to the DRM (1995).  
An important consideration which has been heavily debated throughout the 
literature is whether or not the DRM paradigm has any relevance to the psycho-legal 
debates about recovered, repressed, and false memories. Roediger & McDermott (1995) 
argue that since remembering words is a memory event, then perhaps the same 
mechanisms occur for remembering an actual event. These researchers also argue that 
their results were produced using a lab paradigm which generally causes very few errors 
with college students, who are “professional memorizers”. Because memory is so 
relevant to college students, their formation of false memories is very compelling. 
However, not all researchers are convinced by the DRM (1995) link between false 
memories for words and events. Some researchers think that making this link is 
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inappropriate due to the units of analysis (Freyd & Gleaves, 1996). In essence, these 
researchers argue that false memories for words and events are not the same. However, 
Freyd & Gleaves do  not extrapolate on what kinds of mechanisms might make these two 
kinds of memories different. 
This experiment is the first of its kind to show that different predictive factors 
may underlie the two false memories, which point to the hypothesis that different 
cognitive mechanisms underlie different types of false memories. Words which have little 
emotional and no social context for a participant differ from events which include factors 
such as social compliance. Future research should try and separate out social compliance 
and other external factors from any of the experimental false memory paradigms for 
events such as the KK (1996) paradigm.  
While the results of this experiment are encouraging in demonstrating that there 
are different types of false memories that have different underlying cognitive 
mechanisms, they must be taken with caution. First of all, is the effect size is weak due to 
the small sample size (eta²=.07). More participants need to be run in order to produce 
stronger results. In addition, there were many more female participants run in this 
experiment than male participants, which was also a problem in Peiffer & Trull (2000). 
Tousignant (1984) has demonstrated that women tend to be more suggestible (as cited in 
Peiffer & Trull, 2000). A more balanced group of participants across gender would make 
the results more valid. Similarly, Ceci & Bruck (1995) have shown children to have a 
higher rate of formation of false memories. Gudjonsson (1997) has also shown children 
to be more suggestible. Comparing different age groups could be an interesting extension 
of this study. There is also not a lot of variability in college students in terms of 
suggestibility, and it is important that future studies look at different populations as it is 
difficult to generalize from college students. Finally, I was not a masked researcher, and 
was aware of suggestibility scores simply by administering the GSS to my participants. It 
must be taken into account that experimenter expectancy effects might have occurred. In 
the future, a researcher masked to conditions should administer the GSS. However, the 
findings are still relevant and need replication. 
In addition, to really extend my research, it would be interesting to see if there is a 
way to administer the DRM task with a confederate present to see if this would exert 
social compliance upon the participants (Wright, Self, & Justice, 2000). In that situation, 
perhaps the GSS 2 scale would be a more useful tool in determining whether or not the 
formation of false memories in the DRM task is linked to suggestibility. However, it must 
be recognized that the GSS 2 scale and suggestibility may not be relevant to the DRM 
task, and future research could also focus on further understanding for exactly what 
cognitive mechanisms underlie both the DRM task (1995) and the KK task (1996).  
After replicating the results of Peiffer & Trull (2000), it seems clear that 
suggestibility does not play a role in the DRM task. What are the predictive factors which 
may underlie the DRM paradigm? Future research to investigate what types of people are 
more likely to form this type of false memory is necessary. Results indicate that 
suggestibility is linked with the KK task, and future research is needed to replicate these 
results. However, if these results are in fact true, then they have serious psycho- legal 
implications. If the results are supported in future research, then the GSS 1 and 2 should 
not be administered to individuals who claim to have a false memory unless some aspect 
of this false memory has to do with social compliance, such as a witness being prodded 
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by a police officer to remember an event. It should also be brought to the attention of 
police officers that their questioning techniques, especially on highly suggestive 
witnesses may alter the person’s memory permanently, so that one may come to believe 
something which is not true. Due to the serious legal implications concerning eyewitness 
memory as well as the controversy over repressed sexual memory, future research is 
imperative.  
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Appendix 1 
 
The Six 15-Word Lists Used in Experiment  
Chair Mountain Needle Rough Sleep Sweet 
table 
sit 
legs 
seat 
couch 
desk 
recliner 
sofa 
wood 
cushion 
swivel 
stool 
sitting 
rocking 
bench 
hills 
valley 
climb 
summit 
top 
molehill 
peak 
plain 
glacier 
goat 
bike 
climber 
range  
seep 
ski 
Thread 
pin 
eye 
sewing 
sharp 
point 
prick 
thimble 
haystack 
thorn 
hurt 
injection 
syringe 
cloth 
knitting 
smooth 
bumpy 
road 
tough 
sandpaper 
jagged 
ready 
coarse 
uneven 
riders 
rugged 
sand 
boards 
ground 
gravel 
bed 
rest 
awake 
tired 
dream 
wake 
snooze 
blanket 
doze 
slumber 
snore 
nap  
peace 
yawn 
drowsy 
sour 
candy 
sugar 
bitter 
good 
taste 
tooth 
nice 
honey 
soda 
chocolate 
heart 
cake 
tart 
pie 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2 
 
List 1     List 2     List 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
List 4     List 5     List 6 
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Appendix 3 
 
Typing Skills: Questionnaire One 
 
Please answer the questions below to the best of your ability. They are designed 
to access your typing capabilities. 
 
 
 
1) At what age did you learn how to type (approximate)? 
 
 
 
 
2) How did you learn to type (e.g. typing program, classroom, etc)? 
 
 
 
 
3) Approximately, how many words per minute do you type? 
 
 
 
 
4) Approximately, how accurately do you type? 
 
 
 
5) Can you type without looking at the keyboard? 
 
 
 
 
Thank you very much for your cooperation. These data will supplement the actual hands 
on typing you will be doing shortly. 
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Appendix 4 
 
 
1) What happened when you were on the computer? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2) Did you press the ALT key? (If yes, after this question go to #3. If not, go on to 
question #4) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3) Can you remember where in the sequence you hit the ALT key? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4) Please contribute any additional comments you might have. 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you very much for your cooperation. Please seal this in the envelope and hand it to 
the experimenter.  
 
 
 
 
 
